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Casenote
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL-THE DocnNE OF MUTUALI: A DEAD
LETTER-B.R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y. 2d 141, 225 N.E. 2d 195,
278 N.Y.S. 2d 596 (1967), ITS IMPLICATIONS ON THE NEBRASKA POSMON
-Vincent v. Peter Pan Bakers Inc., 182 Neb. 206, 153 N.W.2d 849
(1967).
I. INTRODUCTION
Collateral estoppel precludes a party from asserting or denying
an issue of law or fact which has been previously determined in an
earlier action to which the party, or his privity, participated.' It
differs from true res judicata 2 in that it applies only where the
subsequent action involves a different claim or cause of action.3
Three requirements must be met before collateral estoppel can be
invoked. The issue of law or fact must have been raised by the
pleadings,4 the issue must have been determined by the court, and
this determination must have been necessary to the judgment. The
doctrine seeks to minimize the expense and judicial effort of repe-
titious litigation, protect litigants from possible harassment, and
facilitate reliance upon final judgments. 5
Two questions concerning the parties affected by collateral
estoppel arise when an attempt is made to classify the effect of a
valid judgment: who is bound, and who may use the judgment?
Due process prevents binding a party by a judgment unless he has
had his day in court.6 Consequently, a determination in a lawsuit
1 See Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 353 (1876).
2 The term res judicata is best defined in terms of its effect. A final
determination of any litigation precludes a new suit on the same
"cause of action." If the plaintiff won the prior action, all claims
which he may subsequently raise "merge" in the judgment obtained,
and any further action must be based on that judgment; if he lost,
he is "barred" from suing anew on the same cause of action. Thus
the effect of res judicata may be expressed in three different ways:
(1) that the cause of action was barred by or merged in the first judg-
ment; (2) that the plaintiff cannot split his cause of action; (3) that
the matter might have been litigated in the first action.
3 Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352-54 (1876); RESTATEMENT
OF JUDGMENTS § 45, comment c at 175; § 68, comment a at 293 (1942).
4 The issue of law or fact may also be raised by motion pursuant to
Rule 15 (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
5 See Note, Res Judicata, 1966 DUNE L.J. 283, 285 (1966). Note, Collateral
Estoppel in New York, 36 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1158, 1158-59 (1961). The
policies, of course, are equally applicable to true res judicata.
6 Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Newport, 247 U.S. 464, 476 (1918). However,
under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, class action
judgments will bind all class members fitting the description in actions
classified under Rules 23 (b) (1) and (2), and all named or described
in (b) (3) actions except those who have specifically asked for
exclusion.
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is binding only on those who were either participants or in privity
with such participants.7 The rules of res judicata and collateral
estoppel are concerned only with which persons are to be bound by
a judgment. They do not provide an answer to the more important
question, and the question for discussion: who may use the prior
judgment? Traditionally the answer has been controlled by the
doctrine of mutuality, i.e., for a litigant to use a prior judgment it
must appear that he would have been bound had the prior judg-
ment gone the other way.8
Strict application of the mutuality rule subverts the policy
reasons upon which collateral estoppel is founded. This is because
at times the mutuality rule, without affording any advantages, pre-
cludes use of collateral estoppel and thereby permits repetitious or
harassing litigation. This subversion of policy grounds has led some
jurisdictions to abolish the mutuality rule In New York, where
many of the leading mutuality decisions have been decided, excep-
tions almost engulfed the rule itself. Finally during 1967, the court
of appeals in B.R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall,0 rang the death knell on
the mutuality rule. The purpose of this Note is to analyze the
status of mutuality in Nebraska as evidenced by the recent decision
in Vincent v. Peter Pan Bakers, Inc.. in light of the DeWitt deci-
sion 2 and to propose a full-and-fair opportunity standard for
Nebraska.
I. MUTUALITY IN NEW YORK: A DEAD LETTER
A jeep owned and operated by defendant Hall collided with a
cement truck driven by one Farnum, and owned by plaintiff B. R.
DeWitt, Inc. Farnum, the driver of the cement truck, in an earlier
action had sued the driver-owner of the jeep for damages for per-
sonal injuries. Farnum prevailed in his suit and recovered a sub-
7 Examples of a "privity" relationship are successors in interest in
property, party controlling the litigation, and fiduciaries. The most
typical case is that between an insured tort-feasor and his insurer,
the indemnitor-indemnitee relationship.
8 See Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U.S.
111, 127 (1912). Underlying this rule is the notion that it would be
manifestly unfair to allow a person to benefit from an adjudication
which he could not have been bound by. It is important to keep in
mind that it is for the states to apply or not to apply the mutuality
rule as they may determine whereas the due process limitation is
imposed upon states by the federal constitution.
9 E.g., California; Bernhard v. Bank of America, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d
892 (1942); Delaware: Coca Cola Co. v. Pepsi-Cola, 36 Del. 124, 172 A.
260 (1934); Wisconsin: McCourt v. Algiers, 4 Wis. 2d 607, 91 N.W.2d
194 (1956).
10 19 N.Y.2d 141, 225 N.E.2d 195, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596 (Ct. App. 1967).
11 182 Neb. 206, 153 N.W.2d 849 (1967).
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stantial jury verdict. Thereafter B. R. DeWitt, Inc., the owner of
the cement truck, sued the driver-owner of the jeep for property
damages to its truck. B. R. DeWitt, Inc. moved for summary judg-
ment on the ground that the judgment in the prior action was res
judicata on the issue of liability. The special term granted the
motion but on appeal, the appellate division reversed.'3 Upon cer-
tification of the question to the New York Court of Appeals, the
order of the appellate division was reversed and the special term's
order for summary judgment was reinstated.14
The court in reaching the conclusion that the doctrine of mutu-
ality is "a dead letter"'15 in New York expressly overruled Haverhill
v. International Ry.,1' on the ground that "there seems to be no
reason in policy or precedent to prevent the offensive use of a prior
judgment.' 1 7 The reasoning of the court placed primary reliance
12 For a general discussion of collateral estoppel and the problems of
mutuality, see F. JAMEs, Civm PROCEDURE §§ 11.31-.34 (1965); Currie,
Mutality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9
STAN. L. REv. 281 (1957); Currie, Civil Procedure: The Tempest Brews,
53 CALwi. L. REV. 25 (1965); Editorial Note, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1010
(1967). For a discussion of the Nebraska position, see Comment,
Mutuality of Estoppel: Its Status in Nebraska, 45 NEE. L. REv. 613
(1966).
'3 B. R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 24 App. Div.2d 831, 264 N.Y.S.2d 68 (4th
Dep't 1965).
14 B. R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 225 N.E.2d 195, 278 N.Y.S.2d
596 (Ct. App. 1967).
'5 Id. at 148, 225 N.E.2d at 198, 278 N.Y.S.2d at 601. As a further point
of interest see the dissent. Id. at 148, 225 N.E.2d at 199, 278 N.Y.S.2d
at 602. The dissenters felt that while mutuality of estoppel is no longer
an absolute requirement care should be used in allowing the offensive
use of a prior judgment. The dissenters emphasized the distinction
between the offensive and the defensive use of a prior judgment, the
differences in the practical risks of litigation in the separate actions,
the possibility that there will be an unequal commitment of time,
money, and talent in the preparation of the two defenses, the fact
that there has been no great amount of duplication of litigation under
the prior rule, and that questions of policy and questions of practi-
cality were controlling, not formal relationships between parties and
findings of identical issues.
16 217 App. Div. 521, 217 N.Y.S. 522 (4th Dep't 1926), aff'd, 244 N.Y. 528,
155 N.E. 905 (Ct. App. 1927).
17 B. R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 143, 225 N.E.2d 195, 196, 278
N.Y.S.2d 596, 598 (Ct. App. 1967). The court in the principal case cited
two New York cases allowing offensive use of a prior judgment. The
effect was to answer contentions that only defensive use of a priorjudgment was allowed in New York. These cases were United Mut.
Fire Ins. Co. v. Saeli, 272 App. Div. 951, 71 N.Y.S.2d 696 (4th Dep't
1947), aff'd, 297 N.Y. 611, 75 N.E.2d 626 (1947); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v.
George Colon & Co., 260 N.Y. 305, 183 N.E. 506 (Ct. App. 1932). "The
precedent value of the latter is weakened by its disposition under a
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on the proposition that "one who has had his day in court should
not be permitted to litigate the question anew,"' 8 and that the cri-
teria established in Bernhard v. Bank of America,19 have been ab-
sorbed into the law of New York. Bernhard stated:
In determining the validity of a plea of res judicata three
questions are pertinent: Was the issue decided in the prior adjudi-
cation identical with the one presented in the action in question?
Was there a final judgment on the merits? Was the party against
whom the plea is asserted a party or in privity with a party to the
prior adjudication?20
The standard followed by the DeWitt court in determining that a
party not bound by a previous action could assert a plea of collat-
eral estoppel against a party bound by a previous action was not
explicitly enumerated. However, the court apparently considered
the standard to be whether a full-and-fair opportunity was afforded
to the party in the prior action to litigate the question of his lia-
bility. This is further apparent in light of Cummings v. Dresher,21
workmen's compensation statute, the affirmative (offensive) use being
ascribed to legislative intent. The former ruling countenanced affirma-
tive (offensive) use in fact but its brief exposition of the subject was
sufficiently opaque to permit its dismissal by the lower courts." Note,
Mutuality of Estoppel--Affirmative Use of Collateral Estoppel--Con-flicting Judgments Affecting Similarity Situated Claimants, 43 IND. L.J.
155 (1967).
18 B. R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 144, 225 N.E.2d 195, 197, 278
N.Y.S.2d 596, 599 (Ct. App. 1967), quoting Good Health Dairy Prods.
Corp. v. Emery, 275 N.Y. 14, 18, 9 N.E.2d 758, 759 (Ct. App. 1937).
19 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942).
20 Id. at 813, 122 P.2d at 894-95.
21 18 N.Y.2d 105, 218 N.E.2d 688, 271 N.Y.S.2d 976 (Ct. App. 1966),
The case resulted from a collision between two cars. We can denomi-
nate these two cars 1 and 2. The drivers we will call D and owners 0.
P will stand for passenger. In the first action, in federal court,
Dl (driver of car one) 02
and sued and
P1 (passenger in care one) D2.
The passenger, P, had judgment against both 02 and D2. But Dl lost,
because the jury found him guilty of contributory negligence. Note
that 01 (owner of car one) was not a party to that action. The second
action, afterwards, was in the New York court, where
02 01
and sue and
D2 D1.
The question is whether, in the second action, 01 can use as a defense
anything that emanated from the first action. At first blush, there
would appear to be nothing novel in the holding. We have cases on
the books now where one who was not a party to a prior litigation
is nonetheless able to use collateral estoppel, defensively, against one
who was a party to the prior litigation. The theory is that it is accept-
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the court's most recent pronouncement before DeWitt in the area
of mutuality. The Cummings court said: "Where a full opportu-
nity has been afforded to a party to the prior action and he has
failed to prove his freedom from liability or to establish liability
or culpability on the part of another, there is no reason for per-
mitting him to retry these issues.
'22
It is also important to notice that in DeWitt the court particu-
larly emphasized the facts of the case and the fairness of the result
as evidence of this apparent adoption of a full-and-fair opportunity
standard.
In this case, where the issues, as framed by the pleadings, were
no broader and no different than those raised in the first lawsuit;
where the defendant offers no reason for not holding him to the
determination in the first action; where it is unquestioned that the
first action was defended with full vigor and opportunity to be
heard; and where the plaintiff in the present action, the owner of
the vehicle, derives his right to recovery from the plaintiff in the
first action, the operator of said vehicle, although they do not tech-
nically stand in the relationship of privity, there is no reason either
in policy or precedent to hold that the judgment in the [first
action] ... is not conclusive in the present action .... 23
DeWitt represents adoption of a full-and-fair opportunity standard
in determining whether a party will be prejudiced by collateral
estoppel; and it presages a movement towards greater adoption by
able as long as the one against whom it is being used had his day in
court, as 02 and D2 surely did in the first action. But upon further
probing, it will be found that whenever, in a negligence context, a
person not a party to the first action seeks (in a second action) to use
collateral estoppel against one who was a party to the first action,
the one seeking its use at least had some kind of privity with the one
to whom, in the first action, the findings accrued. Now here, 01 did
have privity with Dl, who was a party to the first action. But no
finding of negligence on the part of 02 and D2 accrued to Dl in the
first action. Since Dl was found contributorily negligent there, the
case never reached a determination of the negligence of 02 or D2 as
against Dl. Thus 01, in the second action, was not relying on findings
made in favor of anyone in the first action with whom 01 had privity.
But P1 in the first action did have the benefit of findings of negli-
gence against 02 and D2, and it is apparently those findings of action
#1 which 01 is permitted by the Cummings case to make defensive
use of in action #2. And there was no privity, in the usual sense of
a link-up of liability such as binds an owner and his driver, between
01 and P1.
22 18 N.Y.2d 105, 108, 218 N.E.2d 688, 689, 271 N.Y.S.2d 976, 977, quoting
Israel v. Wood Dolson Co., 1 N.Y.2d 116, 119, 134 N.E.2d 97, 99, 151
N.Y.S.2d 1, 4 (Ct. App. 1956).
28 B. R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 148, 225 N.E.2d 195, 198, 278
N.Y.S.2d 596, 601-02 (Ct. App. 1967).
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the courts of such a standard.24 Such a development is desirable
to best effectuate the policy reasons underlying collateral estoppel
while still rendering substantial fairness to the individual litigants.
The viability of this standard as a means of best effectuating
the policy reasons underlying collateral estoppel, while still ren-
dering substantial fairness to the individual litigants, is clear in
light of the history of mutuality in New York prior to DeWitt. It
is helpful in discussing the history of mutuality in New York, and
later in analyzing the Nebraska position, to think in terms of the
following three variables: (1) Whether the party invoking collat-
eral estoppel is using it offensively 25 or defensively; 26 (2) whether
the party against whom it is being invoked was the plaintiff or the
defendant in the prior action; and (3) the relationship or lack of
it between the party invoking the judgment and the victorious
party in the earlier suit.
Before DeWitt the rule in New York clearly seemed established
that only defensive use of a prior judgment was allowed.2 7 In Good
Health Dairy Prods. Corp. v. Emery,28 the litigation was the conse-
quence of a car-truck collision with actions being brought by both
sides for damages resulting from the collision. Emery, the driver
of the car owned by his mother, successfully sued both the driver
and the owner of the truck. The truck owner and his driver then
sued the mother who asked leave to amend her answer to assert
the judgment in the prior action as a defense. The court held that
the mother (who could not be bound in the first action where her
son was the plaintiff) was entitled to plead the former judgment
in favor of her son as a defense, thus precluding the truck owner
and his driver from relitigating, as plaintiffs, the issue of negli-
24 In applying the full-and-fair opportunity standard the courts should
be concerned with the following factors: ". .. the size of the claim;
the forum of the prior litigation, the use of initiative; the extent of the
litigation; the competence and experience of counsel; the availability
of new evidence; indications of a compromise verdict; differences in
the applicable law; and the foreseeability of future litigation." Note,
Collateral Estoppel: The Demise of Mutuality, 52 CoRNFLL L. REv.
724, 728-29 (1967).
25 For example, B sues A. B wins. C sues A and establishes A's liability
with the former judgment.
26 For example, A sues B and loses on the grounds of his own contribu-
tory negligence. A sues C. C bars A's suit with the former judgment.
27 See Elder v. New York and Penn. Motor Express, Inc., 284 N.Y. 350,
31 N.E.2d 188 (Ct. App. 1940). But see United Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v.
Saeli, 272 App. Div. 951, 71 N.Y.S.2d 696 (4th Dep't 1947), aff'd, 297
N.Y. 611, 75 N.E.2d 626 (1947), which permits the offensive use of col-
lateral estoppel despite a lack of mutuality.
28 275 N.Y. 14, 9 N.E.2d 758 (Ct. App. 1937).
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gence against her. This was necessary to avoid an anomalous result
in an indemnitor-indemnitee 29 relationship, since the indemnitor
(driver) had been exonerated.
The exception has developed because of the following possibil-
ity: If a suit is brought against the indemnitor (an employee, for
example) for his tortious act, and the indemnitor is found not to
have committed the tort, it is not in keeping with the policy
reason underlying collateral estoppel (that of minimizing repeti-
tious litigation) to allow the unsuccessful plaintiff to bring suit
against the indemnitee (the employer) raising the same issues.
Consider the further possibility that should the indemnitee (em-
ployer) lose in the second suit, he would have a right of indemnity
against the indemnitor (employee) who has already successfully
defended himself. Consequently to avoid such an anomaly the
indemnitor-indemnitee exception to the mutuality rule arose and
it is particular prevalent in the employer-employee situation.
Whenever a stranger or non-party to a prior action sought to
use the first judgment offensively in a subsequent proceeding, the
New York courts generally followed the traditional mutuality
rule. This is attributable to the fact that the anomalous results
occurring in the indemnitor-indemnitee situation do not arise where
a party uses collateral estoppel offensively. An illustration of ad-
herence to the mutuality rule is seen in Elder v. New York & Penn.
Motors Express Inc.,80 a case reaffirming the rule originally estab-
lished in Haverhill v. International Ry.3 ' This rule is that where
mutuality is lacking, a prior judgment cannot be used offensively.
In Elder, a truck driver was unable to plead a former judgment
rendered in favor of the truck owner against a common defendant,
because use of the first judgment in the second suit would "over-
turn fundamental concepts and overrule authorities."3 2 The Elder
court attempted to distinguish Good Health by emphasizing that in
Good Health "the plea of res judicata... was considered solely as
a defense since no attempt was made to ... use it to establish lia-
bility affirmatively [offensively]."3 However, the Elder court
failed to effectively distinguish Good Health. As the rather strong
dissenting opinion in Elder points out, there is little distinction in
principle between the two cases since in both cases "[t]he party
29 RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 96 & comment a at 97 (1942).
3o 284 N.Y. 350, 31 N.E.2d 188 (Ct. App. 1940).
31 217 App. Div. 521, 217 N.Y.S. 522 (4th Dep't 1926), af'd, 224 N.Y. 528,
155 N.E. 905 (Ct. App. 1927).
82 Elder v. N.Y. & Pa. Motors Express, Inc., 284 N.Y. 350, 353, 31 N.E.2d
188, 190 (Ct. App. 1940).
38 Id. at 354, 31 N.E.2d at 189.
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against whom the plea... is raised was a party to the prior action
and 'had full opportunity to litigate the issue of its responsibil-
ity.' ,,34 At this point it seems apparent that though the use of col-
lateral estoppel was generally allowed where invoked defensively
against a party to the prior action it was more likely to be invoked
against the plaintiff to the prior action than the defendant, and
only where the issues were identical.
Even though DeWitt expressly overruled only Haverhill, by
implication it also overruled Elder. This is indicated since refusing
to allow the plaintiff employee in Elder to assert a favorable judg-
ment offensively is hardly distinguishable from the facts in DeWitt,
and Elder's reasoning in refusing the offensive use of the prior
judgment was based on mutuality.
To what extent does the relationship or lack of it between the
party attempting to invoke the judgment and the victorious party
in the earlier suit play in determining whether to allow the judg-
ment in the prior action to be asserted in a subsequent action? In
New York, there has been no case in which collateral estoppel has
been asserted by an absolute stranger to the prior action. The
courts of New York have steadily held that there must be some
privity between the party attempting to invoke the judgment and
the victorious party. For instance, in Israel v. Wood Dolson Co.,s 5
A sued B for breach of contract and was unsuccessful; in a subse-
quent action A sued C for maliciously inducing B to breach the
contract. The former judgment was held binding as against the
plaintiff, although defendant C was a non-party to the former
action. Israel has been cited as holding that "a stranger to an action
may assert the determinations of that action...."-36 However, a
closer reading of the case reveals that the court did not intend that
its holding be treated as adding any new exception to the mutu-
ality rule as expressed above. "It is merely the announcement of
the underlying principle which is found in cases classed as 'excep-
tions' to the mutuality rule."37 Consequently, the courts will not
allow the assertion of a prior judgment unless there is found a
significant relationship or privity existing between the invoker
and the party who was the prior victor in the earlier suit.
The rule in New York prior to DeWitt limiting collateral estop-
pel to defensive use was grounded upon the development of the
34 Id. at 356, 31 N.E.2d at 190.
35 1 N.Y.2d 116, 134 N.E.2d 97, 151 N.Y.S. 2d 1 (Ct. App. 1956).
386 Note, Collateral Estoppel in New York, 36 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1158, 1168
(1961).
37 Israel v. Wood Dolson Co., 1 N.Y.2d 116, 120, 134 N.E.2d 97, 99-100,
151 N.Y.S.2d 1, 5 (Ct. App. 1956).
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indemnitor-indemnitee exception to avoid incongruent results and
upon the policy consideration that a party who has had his day in
court should not again be permitted to litigate the same issue of
liability. It is important that these exceptions to the mutuality
rule were grounded upon the assumption that there had been a
full-and-fair opportunity to litigate. In addition, the fear that irreg-
ular results would occur in multiple-claimant litigation undoubt-
edly made the New York courts most reluctant to summarily
abandon the mutuality rule.88
III. AFTER DEWITT: FULL-AND-FAIR OPPORTUNITY
DeWitt has changed the mutuality rule significantly in New
York. This becomes apparent when the result is analyzed in terms
of the three variables enumerated earlier. Since the plaintiff in
DeWitt was allowed to invoke a prior judgment offensively, the
generally followed rule allowing only defensive use of collateral
estoppel is definitely changed. The rule in Israel which required
some significant relationship between the party attempting to in-
yoke the judgment and the prior victor also is modified. In DeWitt
there was a potentially significant relationship of indemnitor-indem-
nitee. This relationship, however, was rendered insignificant and
problems of reaching an anomalous result as discussed earlier were
avoided once offensive use of the prior judgment was permitted.
What is not clear from the opinion in DeWitt is the extent that
the relationship variable rule has been modified. Consequently, it
is open to conjecture whether there needs to be any significant
relationship or privity between the invoker and the prior victor.3 9
Under the standard adopted by the DeWitt court the uncertainty
of the status of the relationship variable represents no problem.
By placing the emphasis on a determination of whether a party
has had a full-and-fair opportunity to litigate, the court avoids
clouding the issue with a determination of whether there is any
relationship existing between the invoker and the prior victor. The
full-and-fair opportunity standard as announced by the court in
DeWitt is sound and viable. It is viable because the standard is
capable of application on a case-by-case approach. In each individ-
ual case the court's inquiry and attention will be directed to the
question whether the party against whom collateral estoppel is
invoked has had a full-and-fair opportunity to litigate.
38 Currie, Civil Procedure: The Tempest Brews, 53 CAIF. L. REV. 25, 27
(1965).
39 Yet, in the instant case the invoking party could be said to have
derivative rights and liabilities arising solely from the accident involv-
ing his truck driver.
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The full-and-fair opportunity standard provides courts a means
of overcoming their reluctance to apply collateral estoppel in the
multiple-claimant situation and their fear of irregular results which
might occur.40 In multiple-claimant situations there is no need to
retain the mutuality rule as the full-and-fair opportunity standard
protects defendants. Invoking collateral estoppel should be allowed
only in the multiple-claimant situations where there has been a
clear showing that the defendant had a full-and-fair opportunity to
litigate the issue of liability. The overwhelming advantage gained
in adopting this standard rather than adhering to the mutuality
rule is that it enables the individual court to give particularized
treatment to each case. If, from an investigation of the facts and
the circumstances, it appears that a party would be prejudiced by
allowing collateral estoppel to be invoked, then the court should
refuse to allow the prior judgment to be asserted.
Collateral estoppel has been applied in multiple-claimant situa-
tions by other courts.4 1 In United States v. United Air Lines, Inc.,4
a mid-air collision between a passenger plane and a jet fighter re-
sulted in the death of everyone aboard the two planes. Twenty-four
heirs and representatives of the deceased passengers on the United
plane brought separate suits in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of California against the airline. The suits
were consolidated for trial and resulted in a jury verdict for the
plaintiffs on the issue of negligence. Still pending were other filed
cases in the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Washington and the United States District Court for the District
40 This is illustrated by the following problem. Fifty persons are injured
in a train wreck. Each initiates an action to recover for personal
injuries, alleging negligence on the part of the railroad. Each of the
first twenty-five plaintiffs, unable to establish negligence, lose after
separate trials, but the twenty-sixth plaintiff wins. The remaining
twenty-four litigants then invoke collateral estoppel. This is an effort
to prevent the railroad from further litigating the question of its
liability. The argument made is that if the mutuality rule were not
followed the railroad would find itself bound by one loss but unable
to take advantage of its earlier victories, because of the due process
limitation which requires that one have his day in court. Thus it is
argued that the mutuality rule must be retained in the multiple-claim-
ant situation or great injustice will be done to the defendant. This
problem was first posed in Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel:
Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STrA. L. REV. 281 (1957).41 United States v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. Wash.,
D. Nev. 1962), affd on opinion below sub nom. United Air Lines, Inc.
v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 951(1964). Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 934 (1964), which permitted the offensive use of a prior judg-
ment rendered in favor of one group of employees to be asserted by
a second group of employees against the same defendant employer.
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of Nevada. The plaintiffs in these cases moved to transfer to the
southern district of California, in contemplation of trying the issue
of liability before the same jury which had heard the consolidated
cases.4 3 Later, they moved for summary judgment on the issue of
liability asserting that the defendant airline's liability had been
conclusively established by the consolidated cases." The court in
United Air Lines adopted the full-and-fair opportunity standard,
rejected the mutuality rule and specifically held that the defendant
had had a full-and-fair opportunity to litigate the question of its
liability; consequently, the court allowed the prior judgment to
be invoked offensively by non-parties to the first suit against the
defendant. 45
United indicates that the full-and-fair opportunity standard
announced in B.R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hal,46 if adopted by the courts,
can provide a rationale and a persuasive means of achieving the
goals of collateral estoppel in the multiple-claimant situation. The
standard will have the effect of directing the courts toward more
particularized treatment of the individual case. This particularized
treatment is not found in the cases where the courts have stub-
bornly adhered to the mutuality rule. By becoming more particular
in the treatment of the individual case the court's attention will be
directed more to the issues and the merits of the case than at dis-
tinctions between offensive and defensive use of prior judgments
and concern with the party to be estopped.
IV. THE NEBRASKA POSITION
At the present time Nebraska has no defined or established
formula which clearly sets out the status of mutuality.47 A rule of
42 216 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. Wash., D. Nev. 1962), aff'd on opinion below
sub noma. United Airlines, Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 951 (1964).
43 216 F. Supp. at 714.
44 Id. at 717.
45 The court stressed the facts and the circumstances of the particular
case in determining that a full-and-fair opportunity to litigate had
been had by the defendant. "The issue of liability of United Air Lines
to the passengers on the plane was litigated to the hilt, by lawyers
of the highest competence in their field, in the trial of the 24 cases in
Los Angeles.... It would be a travesty upon [justice] ... to now re-
quire these plaintiffs to again re-litigate the issue of liability after it
has been so thoroughly and consummately litigated in the trial court
in... Los Angeles.... The defendant has had its day in court on the
issue of liability...." Id. at 728-29.
46 19 N.Y.2d 141, 225 N.E.2d 195, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596 (Ct. App. 1967).
47 See Comment, Mutuality of Estoppel: Its Status in Nebraska, 45 NEB.
L. REV. 613 (1966).
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law which is worthy of discussion because to some extent it indi-
cates the present status of mutuality in Nebraska is:
Where cases are interwoven and interdependent and the contro-
versy involved has already been considered and determined by the
court in former proceedings involving one of the parties now
before it, the court has the right to examine its own records and
take judicial notice of its own proceedings and judgments in the
former action.48
Cover v. Platte Valley Pub. Power & Irr. Dist.49 illustrates applica-
tion of this rule. In the first suit the plaintiff obtained judgment
that a certain irrigation drain had been negligently constructed so
as to entitle the plaintiff to an injunction requiring the drain to be
corrected. The drain was not corrected and as a result Cover, who
was not involved in the first proceedings, suffered damages from
flooding. An action to recover these damages was brought against
the same defendant as in the prior suit. The court held that the
judgment in the first action was conclusive as to the defendant's
negligence when pled by Cover in his suit. In reaching this result,
the court pronounced the "interdependent" rule stated above say-
ing that: "to hold otherwise would be a travesty upon justice and
permit a trifling with judgments duly rendered according to law."50
While this decision involved a problem of mutuality the court did
not analyze it in those terms. It is noteworthy in that "a compari-
son of the Cover case and those abolishing mutuality leads to the
conclusion that the interdependent rule was used merely as a
different means to the same end."51
The soundness of this conclusion has been weakened in light
of the recent decision in Vincent v. Peter Pan Bakers, Inc., 52 which
reversed a lower court's decision permitting collateral estoppel to
be invoked against the administratrix of employee B, who had
been found negligent in a prior action. The case grew out of a col-
lision between two bakery trucks in which both drivers were
killed. Thereafter, the administratrix of employee A brought an
action for wrongful death against employer B, the employer of
employee B. Employer A was impleaded because of its right of
subrogation for workmen's compensation paid for the death of its
employee A. Soon after this suit had been filed a second suit was
filed. In the second suit the administratrix of employee B brought
an action for wrongful death against employer A and employer B
48 Johnson v. Marsh, 146 Neb. 257, 262, 19 N.W.2d 366, 369 (1945).
49 162 Neb. 146, 75 N.W.2d 661 (1956).
50 Id. at 153, 75 N.W.2d at 668.
51 See Comment, Mutuality of Estoppel: Its Status in Nebraska, 45 NEB.
L. REv. 613, 620 (1966).
52 182 Neb. 206, 153 N.W.2d 849 (1967).
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was joined as a defendant to have its rights of subrogation deter-
mined. While both suits were pending in the district court at the
same time, the suit brought by the administratrix of employee A
was tried first. In this case, the jury found that employee A was
not negligent and that employee B was negligent. This finding was
affirmed on appeal.53 Employer A, a defendant in the second suit,
then filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's petition asserting that
the judgment in the first suit was collateral estoppel in the second
suit. This motion to dismiss was granted. On appeal the decision
by the lower court was reversed. The court in a short opinion indi-
cated that collateral estoppel is generally asserted against a person
who "'(1) ... has had the opportunity to litigate the matter or (2)
his interests have been adequately represented in the litigation of
the matter. . . ." 54 However, the court does indicate an awareness
of the offensive use of a prior judgment 55 but because the court
feels that "'. . . the whole area is in a state of flux, it is difficult to
chart the development of the future ... . "," This leads the court
to conclude that collateral estoppel against the plaintiff in the in-
stant case would be prejudicial to her rights.
The concurring opinion points out that one of the weaknesses
of the majority opinion is that it creates a situation which could
lead to an anomalous result. The concurring opinion states that:
In the instant case, the result could well be calamitous from the
standpoint of reason, law, and justice. In the first case, the jury
found that Vincent[B] was negligent and Lorenzen [A] was not....
In the second case, the jury could find that Lorenzen [A] was negli-
gent and Vincent [B] was not negligent and result in verdicts andjudgments for each against the other's employer on the identical
evidence. That an injustice would have been done to one of the
employers is self-evident. The law cannot tolerate such a result.57
The concurring opinion further indicates that if the issues are the
same and there is no new evidence that could possibly be intro-
duced by the party to be estopped then the notion that every person
is entitled to his day in court is not present and collateral estoppel
should be allowed to be asserted. However, the concurring opinion
53 See Lorenzen v. Continental Baking Co., 180 Neb. 23, 141 N.W.2d 163
(1966). The findings were affirmed on the issue of liability, but the
case was reversed and remanded for new trial on the issue of damages
only, because the verdict was excessive under the law of Iowa where
the accident occurred.
54 Vincent v. Peter Pan Bakers, Inc., 182 Neb. 206, 207-08, 153 N.W.2d
849 (1967), quoting Vestal, Preclusion Res Judicata: Variables, 50
IowA L. REv. 27, 75 (1964).
55 Id. at 208, 153 N.W.2d at 850.
56 Id. at 208, 153 N.W.2d at 850.
57 Id. at 209-10, 153 N.W.2d at 851.
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goes too far. The opinion concurs in the result stating that "...
the motion to dismiss on the theory of collateral estoppel .. was
prematurely made."58 The basis for the opinion's concurrence with
the result is that only after the plaintiff has submitted his evidence
to the court can a determination be made as to the applicability of
collateral estoppel. Then if the court determines that the issues are
the same and that the evidence is the same under the two actions
collateral estoppel will be available, and the motion to dismiss
should be sustained.
The procedure to be followed as proposed by the concurring
opinion is unusual because it supposedly has as its purpose the
minimizing of repetitious suits by determining that collateral estop-
pel is or is not available. Instead the procedure proposed by the
concurring opinion will serve only to prolong litigation. The pro-
cedure which best serves to effectuate the ends to be achieved by
the use of collateral estoppel is one in which the determination is
made by the court prior to trial for a second time. Only in this
way can the policy goal of minimizing repetitious litigation be
achieved.
A great difficulty with the result in Vincent is-what happens
on remand if it is found that employee A was negligent? Is em-
ployer A entitled to indemnification from the estate of employee A,
who originally was found not negligent? The majority of the court
has rejected the indemnitor-indemnitee exception and consequently
has made possible the happening of anomalous results. The greatest
difficulty with the result in Vincent is the arguments and reasoning
espoused. The court had before it the opportunity to define and
establish a formula or a procedure that could be followed in future
litigation. "It is the duty of this court, that it should not shirk,
to provide a procedure that will properly dispose of the litigation
without doing an injustice to anyone."59 The court has by its deci-
sion in the instant case indicated it adheres to a strict requirement
of mutuality, a requirement which is ".... unnecessary, undesirable,
and against the trend of authority."60 This is particularly true in
light of the logic and persuasiveness of B.R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall.6 1
5s Id. at 210, 153 N.W.2d at 851.
59 Id. at 211, 153 N.W.2d at 852.
60 See Comment, Mutuality of Estoppel: Its Status in Nebraska, 45 NEB.
L. REv. 613, 623 (1966)
61 19 N.Y.2d 141, 225 N.E.2d 195, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596 (Ct. App. 1967).
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V. CONCLUSION: THE SHADOW DEWITT CASTS
ON THE NEBRASKA POSITION
The full-and-fair opportunity standard announced and adopted
by the court in DeWitt represents the formulation of a sound pro-
cedure by which to determine whether collateral estoppel is or is
not available. It is a standard which provides the means of achiev-
ing the purposive goals of collateral estoppel. It is submitted that
in future litigation dealing with the applicability of collateral estop-
pel to a particular fact situation the court should adopt and pursue
a full-and-fair opportunity standard. The adoption of this standard
would serve to meet the challenge that comes with any formula-
tion of sound principles which are definite enough to be followed in
future litigation and at the same time fulfill the court's duty to
provide a procedure that will properly dispose of litigation.
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